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IN THE SUPREME COUR7 OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BIG BuTTE RANCH, INC. , 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MARJORIE R. HOLM, CARL 
WILLIAM HOLM and ESTHER 
B. HOLM, His Wife, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
CASE NO. 14630 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein the Appellant brought suit against 
the Respondents to enforce a provision in a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, which provision was found by the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to have been 
terminated and of no force and effect whatsoever. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court found that the Termination Agreement en-
tered into between the parties was ambiguous and allowed oral tes-
timony to explain the same; and thereafter found that the Appellant 
was estopped to now attempt to enforce the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract that was the subject of the Termination Agreement. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that this Court should affirm tf:t: decisi'; 
of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant and CARL O.N. HOLM, MARJORIE HOLM, CARL W. HOLY. 
and ESTHER B. HOLM, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Co~tract on or 
about the 1st day of April, 1969, for the purchase of a farm ir. IJaho 
(R. 5-12) of which CARL O.N. HOLM, who died prior to the commencement 
of this action, was the principal purchaser. CARL W. HOLM, sc ,1 c~ 
CARL O.N. HOLM, and his wife, ESTHER HOLM, the only Respondents who 
lived on and worked the farm, remained on the farm for approximately 
three years when the Respondents then defaulted under the terms of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. On August 28, 1972, the Respond-
ents and Appellant entered into a Termination Agreement (R. 34-37) 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
The Termination Agreement was drafted by Ronald c. Barker, 
who is the attorney and an officer for the Appellant. The document 
was explained by Ronald c. Barker, who represented to the Respond-
ents that all obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract endec 
upon the execution of the Termination Agreement. (See Point II for 
testimony.) 
The Respondents were led to believe that any and all obli-
gations which they had to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and 
wheat to the Appellant, and which under Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was purported to survive any termina-
tion or default of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract, ter-
minated upon the execution of the Termination AgreeMent. The 
-2-
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Respondents were brought to this position because of the wording in 
the Termination Agreement and the representations made to the Res-
pondents by Ronald C. Barker and the president of the Appellant cor-
poration, Harold K. Beecher. (See Point II for testimony.) 
It would appear that all the Appellant and its attorney had 
to do in preparing the Termination Agreement in order to preserve 
the payment of beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat was to speci-
fically and clearly state in the Agreement that beef, lamb, potatoes, 
honey and wheat should still be supplied. During the discussions 
that were held at Mr. Beecher's office on August 28, 1972, between 
the Respondents and Ronald C. Barker and Harold K. Beecher, on the 
Termination Agreement, the obligation to furnish beef, lamb, pota-
toes, honey and wheat was not raised nor did any of the parties re-
call the subject matter being discussed. (T. 63.) The discussion 
between the parties was that all obligations under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract ended upon execution of the Termination Agreement, 
not that anything survived the Termination Agreement. It should be 
noted that once the Respondents had left the farm that the Respond-
ents were without means to furnish the beef, lamb, pot.atoes, honey 
and wheat to the Appellant, for that produce came from the farm 
operations, and the Appellant knew this when the Termination Agree-
ment was executed. 
Prior to the Termination Agreement being executed, the App-
ellant requested CARL W. HOLM and ESTHER HOLM, his wife, to remain 
upon the land to tend and care for it until the Appellant could find 
nother purchaser. (T. 124.) CARL W. HOLM and his wife, ESTHER HOLM, 
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agreed to remain in possession of and care for the subj t::c :_ property 
and did so until the first part of January, 1973. 
On the 30th day of April, 1975, the Appellant caused to be 
served a Swnmons and Complaint, alleging that the Respondents had 
not supplied the Appellant with the beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and 
wheat which was the subject matter of Paragraph 25 of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. (R. 2-18.) 
At no time prior to the commencement of this action and since 
the Termination Agreement had been entered into between the parties 
had the Appellant made any demand upon the Respondents for any beef, 
lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat. (T. 107.) A period of almost three 
years had elapsed since anything dealing with the obligations under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was mentioned as surviving the 
Termination Agreement. 
The wording of the Termination Agreement is such that only 
one conclusion could be reached, to-wit: that all rights, duties, 
liabilities and obligations of all the parties to the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract were terminated upon the execution of the Termina-
tion Agreement. 
The Trial Court held that the Termination Agreement was am-
biguous and allowed oral testimony to be presented, after which the 
Trial Court accepted the Respondents' interpretation of the Termina· 
tion Agreement that they believed they had no further obligation to 
supply produce to the Appellant. The Trial Court further held that 
the actions of the parties from August 2 5, 19 7 2 up to the commencemer.: 
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of this action lends credence to the interpretation of the Termina-
tion Agreement as given to it by the Respondents that they had no 
further obligation to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat 
to the Appellant. 
The Trial Court further held that the Appellant had created 
the ambiguous language in the Termination Agreement and thus, as 
drafter of the Agreement it was to be construed against the Appell-
ant, and that because of the Appellant's actions and silence for 
almost three years on Respondents' alleged obligation to the Appell-
ant, the Appellant was estopped from asserting a claim to the beef, 
lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat. (R. 62-64.) 
POINT I 
THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS AMBIGUOUS. 
Upon reading the Termination Agreement entered into between 
the parties on August 28, 1972 (T. 34-36), one can easily assume 
that any obligation or liability owing between the respective par-
ties has now terminated. This is especially true when one reads 
from Paragraph 3 the following wording: 
"First party hereby releases second, third and 
fourth parties from further liability or obligation 
under the terms of said Uniform Real Estate Contract 
The Respondents, upon reading the Termination Agreement and 
from the representations made to them by Ron Barker, secretary and 
attorney for the Appellant, believed that all obligations and lia-
bilities, including the obligation to furnish beef, lamb, potatoes, 
honey and wheat, which was part of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
to the Appellant, had ended upon the making and siqning of the 
-5-
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Termination Agreement and it wasn't until almost three years later 
that Appellant took a contrary position. 
After reading the pleadings and the Termination Agreement the 
court determined the Agreement to be ambiguous. Where parties place 
different meanings on a contract and there is evidence that the in-
tent of the parties may be different or the contract on its face may 
be seen as being ambiguous, giving use to different interpretations 
by the parties, the Court may, upon either of the above, have the 
contract declared as being ambiguous. Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing 
Corp, 17 U. 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 30 (1965); Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 U. 2d 255, 408 P. 2d 910 (1965); 
Maw v. Noble, 10 U. 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121 (1960); Wingets, Inc. v. 
Bitters, 28 U. 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972); Continental Bank and 
Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 u. 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773 (1957). 
Each of the parties in this case had placed different inter-
pretations on the meaning and intent of the Termination Agreement. 
When this is coupled with the actions of the Appellant wherein the 
Appellant represented to the Respondents that all obligations had 
terminated and that the Appellant did not ask for any beef, lamb, 
potatoes, honey and wheat for almost three years after the Termina-
tion Agreement, it is easily seen that the Respondents were correct 
in their belief that their obligations to the Appellant were for-
ever terminated. 
A Court in interpreting a contract will interpret it as sho~ 
by the acts of the parties themselves. Zeese v. Siegel, 534 P. 
2d 85 (1975); Hardinge Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp. 1 U. 2d 320, 266 p, 
-6-
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2d 494 (1954); Snow v. Utah Automobile Dealers, 112 u. 431, 188 P. 
2d 742 (1948). The acts of the parties in this matter were such as 
to terminate all obligations upon the execution of the Termination 
Agreement. 
It was reasonable for the Respondents to believe that all 
obligations terminated when the Agreement was signed. The Termina-
tion Agreement specifically referred to the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract which contained the provision that the Respondents were to 
supply the Appellant with beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat. 
As noted in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U. 2d 261, 
501 P. 2d 266 (1972), a case involving the leasehold interest in 
houseboats, the general rule of law where there are two separate 
agreements which relate to the same subject matter, is to read the 
documents together. 
. . the rule of law where two or more instruments 
are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or 
at different times in the course of the same transaction, 
and concern the same subject matter, they will be read 
and construed together so far as determining the respec-
tive rights and interests of the parties, although they 
do not in terms refer to each other." (Cites omitted.) 
P. 2d at 271. 
Thus, from reading the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the 
Termination Agreement together, the Respondents were justified in 
their belief that all obligations contained within the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract ended upon execution of the Termination Agree-
ment. The Termination Agreement stated that the Respondents were 
relieved from further liability or obligation under the terms of 
the Unifo~m Real Estate Contract. The Uniform Real Estate Contract 
contained the requirement for beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat 
Which is the subject matter of this action. Placing the documents 
-7-
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together the Respondents thus interpreted their obligation to supply 
beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat to the Appellant as having 
ceased, because all obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract were now terminated. The Trial Court recognized thE: ambigui tJ 
of the Termination Agreement and how a reasonable man unjE:r th~ cir-
cumstances could believe that the obligation to furnish beef, lamb, 
potatoes, honey and wheat had ceased. Because of this, thE: Trial 
Court ruled correctly in determining the Termination Agreel".ent to 
be ambiguous. 
Because the Agreement was ambiguous on its face the Trial 
Court properly allowed parol evidence to determine the intE:nt and 
meaning of the terms of the Agreement and what the parties had 
meant when they signed the Agreement. 
When a contract is ambiguous the Court may allow paro: evi-
d.::•1ce to determine the intent of the parties and thus the con.;L:-.lc-
tion to be given to a contiact. Zeese v. Siegel, supra; Continen-
tal Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, supra. 
In this case, the Trial Court concluded that the parties had 
meant to terminate all their liabilities and obligations owing to 
one another and thus the obligation of the Respondents to supply 
the Appellant with beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat had ended. 
The Termination Agreement had in fact terminated all obligations 
arising under 'the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW OF UTAH IN CONSTRUING THE TERMIN-
ATION AGREEMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT. 
The Appellant not only drafted the document which was arnbiguou~ 
but the Appellant also attempted to mislead the Respondents. 
-8--
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It is well sett~ed law that any ambiguity in a contract should 
be construed against the party who prepared the contract, which in 
this case was the Appellant. Wingets Inc. v. Bitters, supra; Holley 
v. Federal American Partners, et al., 29 U. 2d 212, 507 P. 2d 381 
(1973); Maw v. Noble, supra; J. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 u. 2d 323, 
400 P. 2d 503 (1965). 
Yet in this case the Appellant has not only prepared the con-
tract and created the ambiguity, but also made representations to 
Respondents, in their interpretation of the Termination Agreement, 
to believe that all obligations, including the necessity to furnish 
beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract had terminated. 
The testimony of CARL W. HOLM at the trial was that he be-
lieved and was lead to believe that all obli9~tions ~nder the Uni-
foI""' Real Estate Contract ended upon the execution of the Terrnina-
tior: Agreement and that no demand had ever been made from August 
28, 1972 to the commencement of this lawsuit for the beef, lamb, 
potatoes, honey and wheat. 
"A Well, what I am saying is the wording in this ter-
mination agreement led me to believe that there 
would be no further obligation, produce or whatever, 
because there would be no way to pay it with no farm 
to do it with. 
"Q It's the wording that led you to believe that; is 
that correct? 
"A Yes, uh-huh." (Tr. 99, L. 30; 100, L. 1-6.) 
"Q (By Mr. Barker) Did you understand, after having 
talked with your father or someone else some one 
year before, that if you defaulted and if you lost 
your rights to the ranch because of that default, 
you would still owe the produce? 
-9-
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and 
"A Yes, depending on the circumstances of this thing. 
I mean when you explained to us in the office of 
Mr. Beecher that there would be no further obliga-
tion--" (T. 101, L. 13-19.) 
"BY MR. BEASLEY: 
"Q Mr. Holm, so I understand your testimony, it is your 
testimony that from August 28 of 1972 until this law-
suit was commenced, no one made a demand on you for 
the produce? 
"A Not until we got word of this summons, whatever you 
call it." (T. 104, L. 16-20.) 
Rulon T. Jeffs, who was present at the meeting between the 
parties, testified similarly to CARL W. HOLM in regards to the ob-
ligations between the parties terminating upon the execution of the 
Termination Agreement. 
also: 
"A (Mr. Jeffs) We discussed the terms of the agreement 
and I asked if this resulted in absolving the Holms 
of any further liability under the contract. 
"Q (Mr. Beasley) And was that question responded to? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q And by whom was the response made? 
"A Mr. Barker. 
"Q And what was his response? 
"A That it terminated the further liability of the Holms. 
"Q At the time of this meeting, do you recall any con-
versation with regard to produce? 
"A There was no discussion on the matter o[ p ... u.;.u.ct:." 
(T. 110, L. 4-16.) 
"Q (Mr. Barker) I am not asking about your understanding· 
I am asking about whether or not you asked? 
-10-
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"A Did I ask were they fully terminated from the agree-
ment? Yes·." (T. 116, L. 9-12.) 
further: 
"Q (Mr. Barker) And what was said about that, if anything? 
"A That it absolved from any liability under the contract. 
"Q Mr. Jeffs, who said that? 
"A I understood you said that." (T. 118, L. 18-22.) 
Then the testimony of ESTHER B. HOLM was taken which reinforced 
the ':estimony of CARL W. EOLM and Rulon T. Jeffs. In discussing the 
meeting at Mr. Beecher's office, ESTHER B. HOLM testified: 
also: 
"Q (Mr. Beasley) Do you recall any of the specific things 
that were discussed? 
"A Yes. I remember Mr. Barker saying several times that 
this would terminate us from any further obligation. 
He felt that it was a fair agreement." (T. 123, L. 
28-30 and T. 124, L. 1-2.) 
"Q At any time during that meeting, do you recall anything 
being said with regard to your continuing obligation 
to supply Mr. Beecher with the produce that's set 
forth in the contract? 
"A No, sir. There was nothing said. 
"Q At any time since that meeting, prior to the commence-
ment of this lawsuit, has anyone made a demand upon 
you to supply that produce? 
"A No, sir, they did not." (T. 124, L. 19-27.) 
further: 
"Q (Mr. Barker) Was there any discussion about any parts 
of it that you remember? 
"A Only that Mr. Jeffs asked you if this would terminate 
us from all liabilities, and you said yes it would. 
"Q Do you have a specific recollection of that, or is 
it a little hazy? 
-11-
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"A No. It is not hazy. I remer.iber it. 
"Q And how is it you remember that? 
"A I remember that you were -- you and he were there 
talking. And you had already mentioned several times 
the fairness of the agreement. And he said, 'Does 
this,' or words to that effect, 'does this terminate 
all of their liabilities if they sign this, would it 
terminate all the liabilities they had to Mr. Beecher?' 
And you said yes it would." (T. 127, L. 22-30 and T. 
128, L. 1-5.) 
In each instance the person testifying stated that the Appell-
ant represented to the Respondents that the Termination Agreement 
would end any further obligations or liabilities under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. The Appellant not only represented to the 
Respondents that all obligations ended upon the signing of the Ter-
mination Agreement as to the produce, but represented to the Respond· 
ents that everything in the way of liabilities and obligations undH 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract had now ended. 
In J. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., supra, a case involving the inter· 
pretation of a contract for the delivery of brake shoes, the Court 
stated at P. 2d 505: 
" ••• it seems manifestly unfair to permit one 
who formulates a contract to so fashion it as to 
mislead the other party by setting forth a clearly 
apparent promise or representation in order to 
induce acceptance, and then designedly 'burying' 
elsewhere in the document, in fine print, provi-
sions which purport to limit or take away the 
promise and/or preclude recovery for failure to 
fulfill it. II 
In the case before this Court the Appellant has attempted W 
"bury" its intent in the ambiguity of the Termination Agreement a~ 
then represent to the Respondents that all obligations and liabil-
ities had ended, including the obligation to supply beef, lamb, 
-12-
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potatoes, honey and wheat. It can only be seen from such language 
in the Agreement and the actions of the Appellant that the Appell-
ant attempted to mislead the Respondents into believing that all 
obligations had ceased under the Termination Agreement and that 
the Respondents entered into the Termination Agreement believing that 
all obligations were now terminated. Such a belief was reasonable 
under the circumstances and the Trial Court properly held for the 
Respondents because of this. 
It should also be noted that the actions of the Appellant 
after the execution of the Termination Agreement were such as to 
further lead the Respondents in their belief that all obligations 
to the Appellant had ceased. 
In the present case the actions of the Appellant were: 
(1) making the Termination Agreement; (2) representing to the Res-
pondents that all obligations in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
ended upon the execution of the termination; and (3) never making 
demand, either written or oral, for the delivery of any beef, lamb, 
potatoes, honey and wheat from August 28, 1972 {which was the date 
of the execution of the Termination Agreement) until the commence-
rnent of this lawsuit (T. 197, L. 12-18), which is a period of almost 
three years. From the actions of the Appellant the Respondents 
believed their obligations to the Appellant had ended. This Court 
stated in Zeese v. Estate of Max Siegel, supra, at P. 2d 90: 
"Under the doctrine of practical construction, when a 
contract is ambiguous and the parties place their own con-
struction on their agreement and so perform, the court may 
consider this as persuasive evidence of what their true 
intention was." 
-13-
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In this case, the Appellant stated its intention as ending 
the obligations between it and the Respondents and the Appellant 
then acted to so accomplish such an ending. The Appellant should 
not be allowed to now change its position. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING A CLAIM TO ANY PRODUCE WH!Cc 
WAS PART OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
In Cook v. Cook, et al., 110 U. 406, 174 P. 2d 434 (1946), a 
case involving the payment of insurance proceeds, this Court stated: 
"To constitute an estoppel there must be conduct 
amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of 
material facts; these facts must be known to the party 
sought to be estopped and unknown to the party who 
claims the benefit of the estoppel and who, relying 
upon such conduct, acted upon it to his loss." At P. 2d 
436. [Also see Migliaccio v. Davis, et al., 120 U. 1, 
232 P. 2d 195 (1951).] 
Applying the law in that case, it is clear that the Trial 
Court correctly found estoppel to be applicable. The Appellant 
cannot now assert any claim to beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract after the Termination Agree- ! 
ment has been executed. From the testimony given at the time of 
trial, as previously noted, the Appellant represented to the Res-
pondents that all obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract had ended. The Appellant made no mention that the obligation 
to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat was not terminated I 
by the Agreement. The Appellant concealed from the Respondents that I 
the obligation to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat 
continued after the signing of the Termination Agreement and misrep· 
resented to them that not all obligations under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract ended upon execution of that Agreement. 
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The fact that the obligation to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, 
honey and wheat might ·possibly continue beyond the Termination Agree-
ment was known by the Appellant alone, and not the Respondents. The 
Respondents believed that all obligations under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, including the obligation to supply beef, lamb, 
potatoes, honey and wheat, terminated upon execution of the Termina-
tion Agreement. Thus, the first two requirements of Cook v. cook, 
et al., supra, have been met. 
Finally, the Respondents acted to their detriment in relying 
upon the Termination Agreement in that upon executing the Termina-
tion Agreement the Respondents realized that they would thereafter 
be without any means to furnish produce to the Appellants. But 
acting upon the representations made by the Appellant and the be-
liefs induced by such representations, the Respondents entered into 
the Termination Agreement whereby they would lose the land from 
which they were to furnish the beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat. 
Thus, all the requirements of Cook v. Cook, eL al., supra, 
were presented by the evidence and the Trial Court properly held 
the Appellant to be estopped from asserting a claim to the produce. 
The actions of the Appellant would lead a person to believe 
that the obligations between the parties had terminated upon the ex-
ectuion of the Termination Agreement. In Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 
30 u. 2d 47, 513 P. 2d 417 (1973), a case involving specific per-
formance of a real estate contract, this Court said: 
"The test to be applied is an objective one as to what 
a reasonable and prudent person in the circumstances 
might conclude At P. 2d 420. 
In view of the actions of the Appellant in this matter, where 
the Appellant told the Respondents that their obligations under the 
-15-
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Uniform Real Estate Contract had encee' ~hat th~ App• 
mention anything about t.he beef, J_amb, potatoes, honey 
the time of the execution of the Termination Agreement; and that 
the Appellant made no demand upon the Respondents for the beef, 
lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat for almost three years; it is clear 
that the beliefs and actions of the Respondents were what a reaso~ 
able and prudent person in like circumstances might conclude. 
It should also be noted that it would be unconscionable to 
require the Respondents to furnish the beef, lamb, potatoes, honey 
and wheat, or their cash equivalent, to the Appellants. In~, 
et al. v. Spencer, et al., 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952), a case 
involving the cancellation of a contract for the purchase of realty 
and return of the down payment, this Court stated: 
11 where enforcement of the forfeiture provision 
would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery, 
bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damage 
suffered, we have uniformly held it to be unenforceable 
II At P. 2d 450. 
In the case presently before this Court the Appellant has 
suffered no actual damage. Though Perkins, et al. v. Spencer, et 
al., supra, was about a forfeiture provision, the same unconscionable 
and exorbitant recovery that was attempted in that case is being 
attempted in this case. This Court should not allow enforcement of 
the continuing obligation of the Respondents to supply the Appellant 
with beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat, especially since the 
Appellant has retaken the farm which was the only means that the 
Respondents had for supplying such items to the Appellant. 
Though the defense of estoppel was not affirmatively ple~ 
in the instant action, a motion to amend the pleadings to conform 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the evidence was made to the Court and granted. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 (b). 
Such action by the Court was proper because the evidence of 
estoppel was before the Court. Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 
6 U. 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517 (1957). 
In this case before the Court the same issues of law and 
fact would have been presented to the Court whether or not the 
court had made a ruling on whether the Appellant was estopped to 
assert its claim. The Appellant was not prejudiced in any manner 
by Respondents' failure to affirmatively plead estoppel. The iss-
ues of fact and law remained the same whether or not estoppel was 
raised in the pleadings by the Respondents. The Trial Court would 
not have heard any new evidence in this matter had estoppel been 
affirmatively plead. The actions of the Trial Court in denying 
the claim of the Appellant to any beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and 
wheat was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents submit that the District Court was correct 
in its finding that the Termination Agreement was ambiguous and 
that the same should be construed against its maker, to-wit: the 
Appellant. 
The District Court was Further correct in finding that the 
Appellants were estopped to now claim the beef, lamb, potatoes, 
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honey and wheat from the Respondents and thus the decision of the 
District Court should be affirmed and Respondents should be a·.-arde~ 
their costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of :::::Y, 1977. 
. J1.~; 
N. BEASLEY t 
Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Beas!, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Suite 430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TELEPHONE: 531-1300 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid, to 
RONALD C. BARKER, Attorney 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, 
for Appellant, 2870 South State Street, 
this,? day of~ 1977. 
1 c/}CLv~v(_ }[ . (~L.~&: I 
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